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Family life: The Awá in Brazil live in extended 
family groups — several hundred of them in 
contact but a larger number still uncontact-
ed. Like many Amazonian Indians, Awá carry 
young babies in slings, traditionally made from 
palm fi bres, but nowadays from cloth. (Photo: 
© Domenico Pugliese/Survival International.)With diversifi cation came inequality, 
and a small number of people at 
the top of the social pecking orders 
could enjoy luxuries that were entirely 
unthinkable in the more equitable 
hunter-gatherer societies. For the 
majority who worked the farms and 
then later on in the heavy industry, the 
‘civilised’ lifestyle involves a lot of hard 
work rewarded with very little, tightly 
circumscribed pleasure. Members of 
isolated Amazonian tribes given the 
“full information” about the living and 
working conditions of the majority of 
people around the world might still 
conclude that civilised life is a more 
subtle form of slavery. 
All things considered, in the 
interest of human diversity and of the 
continuing existence of human lifestyles 
that aren’t necessarily worse than ours, 
it is probably worth governments trying 
a little harder to protect the last free-
living humans both from the greed and 
brutality of our economy and from any 
well-meaning anthropologists. 
Michael Gross is a science writer based at 
Oxford. He can be contacted via his web page 
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Between 2005 and 2007, a quartet 
of bestsellers by Sam Harris, Richard 
Dawkins, Dan Dennett, and Christopher 
Hitchens launched the New Atheism. 
Emboldened by the growing success of 
science in explaining the world (including 
our own minds), inspired by new research 
on the sources of religious belief, and 
galvanized by the baleful infl uence of 
religion in world affairs (particularly 9/11 
and its aftermath), these Four Horsemen 
of the New Atheism — as they came to 
be called — pressed the case that God 
does not exist and that many aspects of 
organized religion are pernicious. 
Though in the ensuing decade a 
growing sliver of the population has 
become disenchanted with religion, the 
majority of Americans still believe in 
God. Indeed, even many intellectuals — 
including scientists — are not ready 
to let go of religion. Few sophisticated 
people, of course, profess a belief 
in the literal truth of the Bible or in a 
God who fl outs the laws of physics. 
But whether it comes from a loyalty 
to family and tribe, a fear of alienating 
purse-string-holding politicians and 
foundations, or a reluctance to concede 
that nerdy scientists might be right 
about the most fundamental questions 
of existence, many intellectuals have 
proclaimed that the new atheists have 
gone too far and that key components 
of religion are worth salvaging. 
The backlash against the New 
Atheists has given rise to a new 
consensus among faith-friendly 
intellectuals, and their counterattack is 
remarkably consistent across critics with 
little else in common. The new atheists 
are too shrill and militant, they say, and 
just as extreme as the fundamentalists 
they criticize. They are preaching to the 
choir, and only driving moderates into 
the arms of religion. People will never be 
disabused of their religious beliefs, and 
Book reviewt 3, 2015 ©2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reservedperhaps they should not be, because 
societies need unifying creeds to 
promote altruism and social cohesion. 
Anyway, most people treat religious 
doctrine allegorically rather than literally, 
and even if they do treat it literally, 
it’s not these folk beliefs that serious 
thinkers should engage with, but rather 
the sophisticated versions of religion 
worked out by erudite theologians. 
According to this new consensus, 
science, too, relies on faith, namely its 
commitment to the empirical method 
and its assumption that the universe is 
lawful. Confi ned to the observable and 
the verifi able, science is, in this view, 
incapable of proving or disproving the 
existence of a metaphysical entity such 
as God. Most importantly, science is 
unable to discover all truths, particularly 
those concerned with meaning, purpose, 
and morality. If science and religion just 
stayed on their own sides of the bed — 
their “non-overlapping magisteria,” as 
Stephen Jay Gould put it — we could all 
just get along. This family of reactions 
has been called “I’m-an-atheist-but,” 
“belief-in-belief,” “accommodationism,” 
and, my favorite, “faitheism.” 
The term faitheism was coined by Jerry 
Coyne, a Drosophila biologist who made 
major contributions to our understanding 
of speciation before becoming a prolifi c 
essayist, blogger and a vociferous public 
defender of the modern synthesis in 
evolutionary biology. (How vociferous? 
His blog is called ‘whyevolutionistrue’.) 
His latest book, Faith Versus Fact, is 
intended not to pile on the arguments 
for atheism but to advance the debate 
into its next round. It is a brief against the 
faitheists — scientists and religionists 
alike — who advocate a make-nice 
accommodation between science and 
religion. As with Michael Corleone’s offer 
to Nevada Senator Pat Geary in The 
Godfather Part II, Coyne’s offer to religion 
on the part of science is this: Nothing.
This sounds more imperialistic and 
scientistic than it really is, because Coyne 
defi nes ‘science’ broadly, to encompass 
any system of belief grounded by reason 
and evidence, rather than faith. On 
this defi nition, many of the humanities, 
such as history and philosophy, count 
as ‘science’, not just the traditional 
physical and social sciences. 
You might object that this defi nition 
of science is so expansive as to be 
meaningless, but one thing that Coyne 
and his opponents agree on is that 
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following common line of reasoning: 
science is incapable of telling us what 
is moral; therefore, we need religion 
to do so. People who advance this 
argument (and there are many — Coyne 
names names) have omitted a vast 
middle ground of secular reasoning, 
namely mainstream moral philosophy, 
which Coyne, in effect, treats as 
continuous with science. 
There’s another reason that Coyne’s 
characterization of science is far from 
vacuous: it admits of no syncretism, 
hybrid, or other mongrel with religious 
faith. This intransigence is not a quibble 
over the meaning of the word ‘science’; 
it’s a statement of how people with any 
appreciation of the value of science 
ought to fi x their beliefs. They should 
treat all claims with skepticism, and 
provisionally accept only those that are 
warranted by arguments and evidence 
that anyone can recognize. They should 
not accept claims on the grounds of 
revelation, doctrine, authority, tribal 
solidarity, subjective appeal, or no 
reason at all — that is, on faith. 
Coyne rejects the common argument 
that science itself is based on faith in the 
validity of reason and the lawfulness of 
nature. He reiterates the point made by 
many philosophers that we don’t, in fact, 
‘believe’ in reason; we use reason — as 
does, necessarily, anyone who raises the 
question of the validity of reason in the 
fi rst place. Reason is non-negotiable; the 
same cannot be said of standard matters 
of faith, such as the divinity of Jesus or 
the existence of an afterlife. But Coyne’s 
own philosophy is more pragmatic than 
foundational: science works. It makes 
valid predictions, from hominin fossils 
to the cosmic background radiation, 
and it allows us to change the world, 
from curing urinary tract infections 
to putting a man on the moon. This 
success provides strong — albeit not 
certain — grounds for believing that its 
methods and assumptions are valid. 
After all, the universe could have been 
like a dream, in which any bizarre 
sequence of events is possible. Taking 
note of its overwhelming lawfulness is 
not at all like accepting claims about 
miracles and deities on faith. Even the 
deepest religious proposition of all — 
the existence of God — is, according 
to Coyne, an empirical question. Here, 
he differs from many of his comrades 
in the anti-creationist movement who C(at least for tactical reasons) impose a 
condition of ‘methodological naturalism’ 
on science which renders it incapable of 
evaluating the claims of religion, carving 
out a safe space in which believers can 
protect their beliefs while remaining 
sympathetic to science. 
Coyne quotes several historical and 
recent writers, particularly Carl Sagan 
and the philosophers Yonatan Fishman 
and Maarten Boudry, while adding some 
examples of his own, to show how the 
existence of the God of scripture is a 
testable empirical hypothesis. The Bible’s 
historical accounts could have been 
corroborated by archaeology, genetics 
and philology. It could have contained 
uncannily prescient truths such as “thou 
shalt not travel faster than light” or “two 
strands entwined is the secret of life.” A 
bright light might appear in the heavens 
one day and a man clad in white robe and 
sandals, supported by winged angels, 
could descend from the sky, give sight 
to the blind, and resurrect the dead. We 
might discover that intercessory prayer 
can restore hearing or re-grow amputated 
limbs, or that anyone who speaks the 
Prophet Mohammed’s name in vain is 
immediately struck down by lightning, 
while those who pray to Allah fi ve times a 
day are free from disease and misfortune. 
Ancillary beliefs, such as the 
existence of an immaterial soul or 
a realm of fate beyond matter and 
energy, are just as falsifi able. We might 
discover a severed head that can 
speak. The data might show that bad 
things happen only to bad people. A 
prophet could predict earthquakes, 
epidemics, and terrorist attacks. My 
late aunt Hilda could beam a message 
from the great beyond telling us under 
which fl oorboard she hid her jewelry. 
The fact that these events are confi ned 
to tall tales and false memories which 
evaporate under scrutiny weakens the 
hypothesis that a God of scripture, who 
presides over immaterial souls, exists. 
There are, of course, diluted versions of 
religious belief which survive such tests: 
allegorical interpretations of scripture, 
deistic gods who create the universe and 
then step back and watch what happens, 
erudite theological systems built on 
abstruse argumentation, and various 
liberal, humanistic, Spinozist, and East 
Asian philosophies which equate ‘God’ 
with the laws of the universe or barely 
mention him at all. The new atheists 
have come under withering attack by urrent Biology 25, R635–R653, August 3, 2015 ©defenders of religion for focusing on 
literalist and fundamentalist brands of 
folk theism, which, they claim, are held 
by a minority of believers instead of these 
more abstract and sophisticated systems. 
Coyne accepts the challenge. He cites 
polling data showing that in fact a large 
majority of religious people believe in 
the miracle-working, soul-supervising, 
prayer-answering God of the Bible, 
rather than the recondite abstractions 
of academic theologians. Nor, for that 
matter, are most theologians content with 
God as a mere metaphor or euphemism, 
or as a bystander who is impotent when 
it comes to accomplishing anything that 
matters. (Not for the fi rst time, a two-
state solution is rejected by both sides.) 
Coyne educated himself in the works of 
the most ‘sophisticated’ theologians, and 
pays them the respect of evaluating their 
arguments by the ordinary standards 
of intellectual discourse. He fi nds these 
arguments to be either patently false 
(such as that humans are endowed 
with an innate faculty for sensing the 
truth about God) or transparent ploys to 
defend the undefendable, such as the 
suggestion that the Resurrection was 
too cosmically important for God to have 
allowed it to be empirically verifi ed. 
Coyne’s fi nal chapter is called “Why 
Does it Matter?”. The ultimate appeal of 
belief in belief is that religion is needed 
(at least by other people) as a bulwark 
against selfi shness, shallowness, 
and immorality. Coyne replies that 2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved R639
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as telling the truth and not harming 
others, are rules for living together 
that any intelligent gregarious beings 
would put into their social contracts, 
needing no divine sanction. In contrast, 
little good can come from parochial 
doctrines that cannot be justifi ed by 
universal standards of reason. Coyne 
doesn’t dwell on obvious historical 
disasters, such as religious wars and 
persecutions, but he devotes a section 
apiece to some of the more insidious 
harms fostered by faith today: the 
withholding of medical care to sick 
children, the suppression of heretical 
biomedical research and public-health 
policies, the opposition to assisted 
dying, and the denial that anything 
should be done about anthropogenic 
climate change. In several sections, 
Coyne plays the ultimate empiricist 
trump card: data from Greg Paul 
showing that the godless democracies 
of northern and western Europe are 
thriving, while the religious ones — most 
pointedly the United States — have far 
higher rates of societal dysfunction, 
such as violent crime, preventable 
disease, and mediocre education. 
In his book, Coyne has examined 
every talking point in the New Atheism 
debate but one: the allegedly shrill, 
militant, extremist, fundamentalist 
tone of the anti-God squad. Here he 
leads by example. Faith Versus Fact is 
unquestionably partisan, but its tone is 
matter-of-fact, and the offense that its 
targets will surely take will come from 
the force of his arguments rather than 
any ridicule or cheap shots. Indeed, my 
only real criticism of the book is that it 
has been stripped of the sass and wit 
that enliven his blog whyevolutionistrue. 
Nonetheless, Faith Versus Fact is clear 
and gripping, and should be read 
by anyone interested in the tension 
between science and religion. By 
meeting the claims of the faitheists and 
accommodationists head-on, Coyne 
shows that in this debate the two 
sides aren’t preaching to their choirs 
or talking past each other, and that 
the truth does not always fall halfway 
between two extremes. 
Steven Pinker is Johnstone Professor of 
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perception, with a particular focus on 
visual appearance. The goal of this 
work is to explain why things look the 
way they do.
What fi rst attracted you to biology? 
This goes back to my youth, and my 
curiosity about how life could have 
arisen. I was (and remain) overwhelmed 
with curiosity and awe about how 
life could arise from inanimate ‘stuff’. 
How could mere stuff spawn the 
existence of organized, living systems? 
How could the stuff of physics give 
rise to conscious minds that pose 
questions about their own existence 
and experiences? Evolutionary theory 
provides an understanding of how 
different forms of life could evolve 
through processes of natural selection, 
but it already presupposes the 
existence of life; it says nothing about 
how systems that could be subjected 
to selective pressures arose in the 
fi rst place. The term ‘random’ was 
offered as a means of creating options 
within living systems, but it seemed 
utterly useless in explaining how living 
systems came to be, or possess the 
kinds of qualities unique to living 
systems. 
So I presume this led you to study 
biology at University? My main 
passion when I left high school was 
biology. Somewhat ironically, however, 
I could not take a biology course in 
my fi rst year attending University, 
because I had succeeded in passing 
an advanced placement test. An idiotic 
bureaucratic policy precluded fi rst 
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course until my second year, so I was 
left to explore other fi elds. I fell in love 
with the life offered at University; an 
environment dedicated to the pursuit 
of all forms of knowledge, populated 
by people that were as curious as I 
was about nature and our place in it. 
I explored topics that could provide a 
deeper understanding of what it meant 
to be, to know, to understand, and 
explain; both the nature of the physical 
world, and the nature of knowledge 
and understanding. I was young, and 
was obsessed with the big questions. 
Those interests remain and underpin 
everything that I do, but the realities and 
pragmatics of producing research has 
relegated these issues to the implicit 
background of most of my work.
How did you come to study 
perception? A friend of mine told me 
that there was a purportedly brilliant 
but incomprehensible Professor of 
Psychology (Robert Shaw) who taught 
a course in perception. It was here 
that I felt like all of my major interests 
came together. Perception involves the 
intersection of knowing and being, of 
epistemology and ontology. It involved 
all of the sciences, and some of the 
deepest issues in philosophy. I felt 
like I had found a topic that allowed 
me to explore all of my intellectual 
passions in one fi eld. What does it 
mean to have a scientifi c explanation 
of perception, or of psychology more 
generally? If biological systems are 
the products of natural physical 
processes, which are governed by 
physical laws, then it seemed natural 
to expect that psychological processes 
should also be expressible as laws. 
The approach being pursued by 
the Ecological Perception group to 
which Shaw belonged (headed by 
himself and Michael Turvey) was to 
understand psychological processes as 
a particular kind of physics. To this end, 
they looked for theoretical guidance 
from the physics of self-organization, 
and sought to understand how the 
concept of ‘laws’ could be extended to 
psychological processes. I began by 
attempting to understand what it meant 
for something to be a natural (physical) 
law, and then turned my attention to the 
fi eld of nonlinear thermodynamics and 
statistical mechanics to understand the 
basis of self-organization in physics.
